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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
the jurisdiction conferred on the court by Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2 (3) (j) (1953 as amended). The Division of Real Estate 
(hereafter "Division") appeals seeking judicial review of an 
Order of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County 
directing the payment of $23,000 from the Real Estate Recovery 
Fund (hereafter "Fund" or "Recovery Fund") to the four 
respondents in the amounts of $5,750 each (total of $23,000). 
The Division seeks to limit the recovery to $10,000, while 
respondents seek to expand the recovery to $29,026*51. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On April 9, 1987, following a trial held January 30, 1987, 
the Court entered its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions Of Law" 
and a "Judgment" (R 84-90) for respondents and against the real 
estate licensee, Steven Carter and his company, SRC Investment 
Company (hereafter "Carter"), for $34,026.31. This judgment 
included $5,000.00 in punitive damages, which the parties agree 
cannot be collected from the Recovery Fund. The balance of the 
$29,026.31 judgment is comprised of $23,000.00 damages (R 43-45), 
$5,740.00 attorney's fees, and $286.31 costs. After failing to 
obtain payment from Carter, respondents, on May 16, 1988, 
petitioned the District Court for an order directing the Division 
to pay respondents $29,026.31 out of the Recovery Fund. The 
Division objected to the payment of any more than $10,000.00. 
Hearing was held on July 12, 1988, and the District Court granted 
respondents1 petition in the amount of $23,000.00, or $5,750.00 
for each of the four individual respondents. The District Court 
applied the current version of the statute and refused to include 
attorney's fees or costs, thereby limiting the recovery to 
$23,000.00. The Division has timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court correctly interpreted the 
Real Estate Recovery Fund Act (hereafter "Act") to allow recovery 
on a "per person" or "per claimant" basis, or whether the Court 
should have held that since only one parcel of real estate was 
involved, that there was only one "transaction", and limited 
recovery on a "per transaction" basis to only $10,000, regardless 
of the number of victims and regardless of the number of 
fraudulent acts by the real estate licensee? 
2. Whether the Division, more than a year after the 
judgment against the real estate licensee became final, can 
attack the District Court's findings and judgment entered April 
9, 1987 setting forth five fraudulent acts by the real estate 
licensee and concluding that the judgment entered was based on 
"••• five transactions of fraud and misrepresentation", when the 
Division was served with notice of the action at the time the 
complaint was filed and failed to intervene in the action? Does 
res judicata, waiver or estoppel apply to preclude the Division's 
claim that there was only one transaction so only one payment of 
$10,000 is required? 
3. Whether the District Court correctly held that its 
decision was governed by the law in effect at the time the 
petition was filed (May 16, 1988), or whether its decision should 
have been governed by the law in effect at the time the cause of 
action arose against the real estate licensee and notice served 
on the Division (January and February, 1986). If the latter, 
does this law allow recovery of attorney's fees and costs in 
addition to the $23,000 awarded by the District Court? 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THIS CASE 
The following statutes are determinative of this case, and 
must therefore be considered by the Court: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2a-l, et. seq. (1953, as amended) 
known as the "Utah Real Estate Recovery Act." These statutes are 
reproduced in full in the Appendix to appellant1s brief. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l), in effect in January and 
February, 1986, as follows: 
11
 (1) If any person obtains a final judgment in a court of 
competent jurisdiction against a real estate licensee in 
this state, based upon fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit 
in any real estate transaction, that person may, upon 
termination of all proceedings including appeals, file a 
verified petition in the court where the judgment was 
entered for an order directing payment from the Real Estate 
Education, Research, and Recovery Fund for the actual 
damages included in the judgment and unpaid, but not more 
than $10,000. Recovery from the fund shall be for the 
actual damages included in the judgment and unpaid, but not 
more than $10,000 for a single transaction and no more than 
$50,000 for any one licensee." 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1953, as amended), as follows: 
"No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the District's Court decision 
allowing each respondent to recover $5,750.00 from the Recovery 
Fund, for a total of $23,000.00. Respondents also seek a 
determination by the Supreme Court that the District Court should 
have applied the statute in effect when the cause of action 
arose, and a ruling that said statute permits attorney's fees and 
costs to be recovered as damages. 
Should the Supreme Court determine that the claims of the 
four individual respondents must be aggregated as one claim 
because only one parcel of real property was involved, then 
respondents ask the Supreme Court to affirm the decision on the 
independent ground that the the findings and judgment entered 
against the real estate licensee on April 9, 1987 was based on 
five transactions of fraud and misrepresentation which the 
Division cannot attack more than a year after that judgment 
became final, and that respondents can recover up to $10,000 on 
each transaction, limited to $50,000 against any one licensee and 
further limited to the amount of their judgment, less punitive 
damages, or $29,026.51. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 27, 1974 respondents entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract with Carter to purchase a parcel of real property 
(Trial Ex. P-2). An escrow was established at Southern Utah 
Title Company to receive and disburse the eight annual payments 
required by the contract. However, Carter prevailed upon the 
McBrides to send some of the annual payments directly to him, but 
Carter did not have those payments processed through the escrow 
records. By November 15, 1982, the contract was fully paid, and 
McBrides were entitled to have Carter sign and record a Warranty 
Deed, but none was recorded. 
Carter at that time was indebted to Dr. Lee Atkin on 
unrelated transactions, and Dr. Atkin was pressing for payment 
and/or security for the debt. Carter falsely represented to Dr. 
Atkin that McBrides still owed him $10,112.67 on the contract, 
which Dr. Atkin was able to confirm by the escrow records since 
Carter had received several annual payments that were not 
processed through the escrow. Carter was therefore able to 
persuade Dr. Atkin to accept an assignment of the balance of 
the McBride contract, secured by a Trust Deed for $39,733.50 
(Trial Ex. P-5) on McBrides1 property and other parcels. The 
Trust Deed was signed by Carter on January 21, 1983 and recorded 
June 2, 1983. Not until after this Trust Deed was recorded did 
Carter sign and record (on July 6, 1983) a Warranty Deed 
conveying the property to McBrides (Trial Ex. P-6) . 
Later, when Dr. Atkin did not receive the annual payments he 
expected, he requested Carter to take action. Carter complied on 
July 6, 1984 by signing his name to a Notice Of Default (Trial 
Ex. P-8), but mailed it to an old address for McBrides knowing it 
would not be received, in order to delay the discovery by 
McBrides of his fraudulent acts. Since McBrides made no further 
payments, Dr. Atkin proceeded with a Trust Deed foreclosure. 
McBrides learned of the foreclosure before the Trustee's sale, 
and were forced to purchase the property a second time at the 
Trustee1s sale, which was held on January 16, 1986. 
McBrides filed a complaint against Carter with the Division 
in January, 1986 and on February 7, 1986 McBrides commenced this 
action by filing a complaint against Carter to recover their 
damages. A copy of the complaint was mailed to the Division on 
February 6, 1986 (R 97). The Division did not intervene in the 
lawsuit between McBrides and Carter, but did proceed on the 
complaint against Carter's license. Effective October 19, 1987, 
the Division revoked Carter's license based on his failure to 
remit funds and for engaging in dishonest dealings (R 97). 
After being served with the complaint, Carter acknowledged 
his fraudulent conduct and debt to McBrides by entering into a 
"Settlement Agreement" (R 43-45), in which he agreed to pay 
McBrides $23,000 and also agreed that his debt to McBrides was 
based upon fraud and was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. When 
Carter failed to make any of the agreed payments under the 
"Settlement Agreement", McBrides were forced to pursue their 
claims to judgment. 
A non-jury trial was held January 30, 1987, at which Mr. 
Larry Blake, an officer at Southern Utah Title Company, and Dr. 
Atkin, testified. On April 9, 1987, the District Court entered 
its "Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law" and its "Judgment" 
(R 84-90) . 
The trial court found from the testimony of Larry Blake and 
Dr. Atkin that Carter committed at least five fraudulent acts, 
and listed them as follows: 
(1) Representing to Larry Blake, an officer of 
Southern Utah Title Company, and to Dr. Lee Atkin, to whom 
said defendants were obligated on other matters, that 
plaintiffs owed $10,112.67 to said defendants when, in fact, 
the defendants knew that plaintiffs had already paid in full 
and that no money was then owed to defendants by plaintiffs. 
(2) Advising and requesting plaintiffs to make 
payments directly to Steven R. Carter, even though said 
defendant knew that payments were to be made to Southern 
Utah Title Company as the escrow agent and that this 
violated the Escrow Agreement. Further, by accepting and 
cashing payments from plaintiffs without notifying the 
escrow agent as required by the agreement. 
(3) Granting and signing a Trust Deed in favor of Dr. 
Lee C. Atkin and his wife on January 21, 1983 for $39,733.50 
covering plaintiff's property, even though said defendants 
knew the plaintiffs had already completely paid for said 
property on or before November 15, 1982, and were entitled 
under the real estate contract to a Warranty Deed from 
defendants free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. By 
reason of this Trust Deed, the Court finds that the 
plaintiffs were required to purchase their property a second 
time at the trust deed foreclosure sale conducted by the 
Atkin's attorney. 
(4) Failing to sign and record a Warranty Deed upon 
tull payment by plaintiffs in November, 1982, and by 
delaying the signing and recording of said deed until July 5, 
1983 after the fraudulent Trust Deed was already recorded. 
(5) Preparing, signing, and mailing to plaintiffs, 
when pressured to do so by Atkins, a Notice of Default dated 
July 6, 1984, and intentionally mailed to an address that 
the defendants knew was an old address for plaintiffs and 
that plaintiffs would not receive such notice, all to delay 
the discovery of defendants fraudulent acts, and all done 
when defendants knew there was no default, but that, in 
fact, plaintiffs had paid in full for their property in 
November, 19 82. 
The trial court found McBrides1 damages to be $23,000 for 
being forced to purchase their property a second time at the 
Atkin foreclosure sale, $5,740.00 for attorney's fees, and 
$286.31 for costs, for total damages of 529,026.51. The trial 
court also found punitive damages to be appropriate, and awarded 
$5,000.00 as punitive damages, making the total judgment 
$34,026.51. The trial court, in its conclusions of law, stated: 
"Said judgment is based upon five transactions of fraud and 
misrepresentation, as set forth in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of 
the findings of fact." 
Likewise, the judgment itself recites that it is "based upon five 
transactions of fraud and misrepresentation". 
After attempts to collect on the judgment from Carter failed 
to produce anything, McBrides filed a petition pursuant to UCA § 
61-2a-5 with the District Court seeking an order requiring the 
payment of $29,026.51 from the Recovery Fund. The requested 
amount included attorney's fees and costs, but did not include 
the $5,000.00 in punitive damages as they are not "actual 
damages". The Division objected to the recovery of any amount 
over $10,000. 
Hearing was held on July 12, 1988, and the District Court 
ruled that all conditions for recovery had been met and that each 
of the four McBrides were entitled to recover up to $10,000.00 
from the Recovery Fund. The Court ruled that no attorney!s fees 
or costs were recoverable because the statute in effect at the 
time the petition was filed had recently been amended to 
expressly disallow punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest 
and costs. Therefore, the Court ordered that only $23,000.00 be 
paid to McBrides from the Recovery Fund, with $5,7b0.00 to be 
paid to each of them. 
The Court's findings supporting this order were as follows 
(R 158-160): 
1. That plaintiffs have filed a proper petition and 
have met all conditions precedent and ail conditions 
required by law for recovery from the real estate recovery 
fund. Further, that the Division, in its response to the 
petition, has acknowledged that plaintiffs are entitled to 
receive 510,000.00 from the recovery fund. The Division 
contends that recovery is limited to $10,000.00 because 
there was only one transaction and that multiple claimaints 
harmed by one transaction are limited to $10,000.00 and must 
share therein. 
2. The Court finds that the applicable Utah statute 
should be the statute in effect at the time plaintiffs filed 
their petition for recovery from the real estate recovery 
fund, and not the statute in effect at the time the original 
complaint against the real estate licensee was filed or the 
statute in effect at the time the final judgment was entered 
against the real estate licensee. 
3. The Court finds that plaintiffs sustained actual 
damages of $23,000.00 which were included in the $34,026.31 
judgment against the real estate licensee. The Court further 
finds that none of the judgment has been collected. 
4. The Court finds that the statute in effect when the 
petition was filed on or about May 16, 1988 does not allow 
recovery for punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest or 
Court costs and that plaintiffs cannot recover more than 
$23,000.00 from the recovery fund. 
5. The Court finds that the Utah Real Estate Recovery 
Fund Act is not clear in reference to instances where there 
are multiple claimants, but finds from the wording of the 
statute, Section 61-2a-5 of the Utah Code, that references 
therein that "A person may bring a claim. . ." and "If the 
person making a claim . . . " and also " . . . the person 
making the claim . . . " are all references to a single 
individual and that each individual who has sustained actual 
damages may bring a claim against the recovery fund with 
each claim being limited by the statute to $10,000.00 for a 
single transaction. 
6. The Court finds that each of the four individual 
plaintiffs has suffered actual damages of $5,750.00 (being 
one-fourth of the 223,000.00 actual damages included in the 
judgment) and that each is entitled to receive $5,750.00 from the 
real estate recovery fund. 
7. The Court further finds that the statute is 
remedial and intended to protect the public against loss 
resulting from fraud, misrepresentation or deceit by real estate 
licensees and should therefore be given a liberal construction to 
promote that purpose." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Division seeks to limit recovery to $10,000 on their 
theory that UCA § 61-2a-5(l) means that when only one parcel of 
real estate is involved, there can only be one "transaction" of 
fraud, misrepresentation or deceit by the real estate licensee, 
even when the licensee may have committed several fraudulent acts 
over a period of years relating to that parcel of land. 
In terms of policy, the Division's position is untenable and 
would effectively render the Real Estate Recovery Fund Act 
ineffectual. It would frustrate the declared purpose of the Act 
to provide compensation to the public out of the Fund for damages 
caused by real estate licensees. The Division's interpretation 
would make it extremely difficult to obtain recovery and, when 
weighing the costs versus the benefits of seeking recovery, would 
discourage most, if not all, members of the public who were the 
intended beneficiaries of the Act. This would be so because of 
the $10,000 recovery limitation would then have to be prorated 
among a group of victims, and also because the procedural 
requirements and prerequisites are too burdensome. The victims 
would have to finance the petition, and would know, going in, 
that none of their costs, attorney's fees, or interest on their 
claims can be recovered. 
Respondents contend that the District Court correctly ruled 
that each of the individual respondents could recover up to the 
$10,000.00 limit. The plain wording of the statute, Section 
61-2a-5, supports the interpretation that each person may bring a 
claim by its frequent reference to "a person" or "the person". 
If the legislature had intended to require multiple victims to 
aggregate their claims, it could have described those injured by 
a licensee's fraudulent conduct in a real estate transaction as 
"victims" or "claimants". Even better, the legislature could 
have done what California did — add a specific dollar limitation 
per licensee that applies " . . . regardless of the number of 
persons aggrieved or parcels of real estate involved in a 
transaction . . .". (§ 10474 of the Business and Professions 
Code). 
An independent ground for sustaining the trial courtfs 
ruling applies even if multiple claimants are required to 
aggregate their claims. The Division is precluded by the 
doctrines of res judicata, waiver, and estoppel from challenging 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the 
District Court on April 9, 1987. Respondents make this 
contention on the grounds that the Division was given written 
notice of the complaint against the real estate licensee at the 
time the action was commenced [as required by UCA § 61-2a-5(l)], 
but the Division tailed to intervene in the action to protect the 
interests now being asserted. Those findings, entered April 9, 
1987, specifically found that the real estate licensee committed 
five separate fraudulent acts and concluded that the judgment 
against said licensee was "... based upon five transactions of 
fraud and misrepresentation, as set forth in paragraphs 5, 6 and 
7 of the findings of fact." 
Respondents also argue attorney's fees and costs should have 
been included in the Order because the District Court erroneous 
applied the statute in effect when the petition was filed seeking 
payment from the Fund (petition filed in May, 1988) instead of 
the statute in effect in January and February, 1986 when the 
cause of action arose and notice was given to the Division. In 
1987, between those dates, UCA § 61-2a-5(l) was amended by 
adding, among other things, a sentence stating: "Recovery from 
the fund may not include punitive damages, attorney's fees, 
interest or court costs." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DIVISION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE IS NOT SOUND 
POLICY AND WOULD RENDER THE STATUTE INEFFECTUAL. 
The Division's suggested construction of the statute 
limiting recovery to $10,000 regardless of the number of victims 
when there is only one parcel of real property or where several 
fraudulent acts are committed over a period of time but relating 
to one overall transaction, imposes such great hardship on 
victims that it would be bad policy and would make it so 
difficult to qualify under the statute that the statute would 
become meaningless. The Division's interpretation would require 
the victims, in every case, to pay their own costs and attorney's 
fees while completing all of the following steps, before any 
recovery could be obtained: 
1. File a lawsuit against the licensee alleging fraud, 
misrepresentation and deceit, causes of action which require 
proof by clear and convincing evidence. 
2. Provide the Division with written notice at the time the 
action is commenced against the real estate licensee as required 
by UCA § 61-2a-5(1). 
3. Be prepared and willing to incur, at their own expense, 
the extra attorney's fees, interest and costs, not to mention 
delay in the litigation, that might result if the Division 
exercises its "unconditional right to intervene in the action." 
See Section 62-2a-5(l). 
4. Succeed in the litigation by obtaining a judgment based 
upon fraud, misrepresentation or deceit. 
5. Prevail thereafter in all proceedings including appeals. 
6. Pursue all collection efforts available against the real 
estate licensee, including writs of execution, and make 
reasonable searches and inquiries to find assets to satisfy the 
judgment and exercise reasonable diligence to secure payment from 
the real estate licensee. 
7. Be willing to pay the extra costs and attorney's fees to 
prepare and file a verified petition with the district court 
requesting payment of the uncollected actual damages only (forget 
about punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest and costs). 
8. Prevail at the hearing on said petition by obtaining an 
order directing payment from the fund, but be prepared to be 
limited to your pro rata share of no more than $10,000.00. 
9. Be prepared to defend your victory if the Division 
appeals by paying your attorney, at your own expense and with no 
hope of obtaining attorney's fees no matter how the appeal turns 
out, and be prepared to forgo interest during all of this time. 
It is interesting to note that the Fall, 1984 edition of the 
Utah Real Estate News, a publication of the Utah Real Estate 
Division, states, on page 1: 
"In 1974 the legislature authorized the establishment of the 
Real Estate Recovery Fund in lieu of the requirement for 
brokers to maintain a surety bond. The purpose of the fund 
was to reimburse, within certain limits, members of the 
public when the offending licensee was guilty of fraud, 
misrepresentation or deceit and had no assets that could be 
attached. Very few members of the public have, to date, 
employed the fund and indeed many are unaware that the fund 
exists to provide some relief for their loss." 
The legislature authorized the Division to charge brokers up 
to $18.00 a year and sales agents up to $12.00 a year to finance 
the fund (UCA § 61-2a-4). The same edition of the Utah Real 
Estate News said, on page 5, that the fund "is of sufficient size 
to pay all anticipated claims during the next 18-24 months" and 
stated that over the last several years claims against the fund 
had been inordinately few. As a result, it was announced that: 
"Effective October 1, 1984 the contribution made into the 
Recovery Fund by brokers and salesagents when they obtain or 
renew a license will be reduced from $15.00 to $2.00 for 
brokers and from $10.00 to $1.00 for salespersons." 
During the first 10 years of the fund's existence, from 1976 
through the Spring of 1986, the total recovery fund payments made 
to individuals damaged by a real estate licensee came to 
$229,818.45, according to information in the Spring, 1985 editon 
and the April, 1986 edition of the Utah Real Estate News. The 
yearly average then, is $22,981.85. According to the March, 1989 
edition, there are now over 14,000 licensees in Utah, which means 
that the average cost per licensee ($22,981.85 divided by 14,000) 
is only $1.64 per year. No doubt this beats the cost of bonding. 
The actual net costs of the program may be much lower, because 
before a licensee can obtain a new license, he must fully 
reimburse the recovery fund. Further, the Division is 
"subrogated to all the rights of the judgment creditor for the 
amounts paid out of the fund" (see UCA § 61-2a-9). 
The compelling conclusion is that there is plenty of room to 
liberally construe the statute to promote its purposes without 
threatening to bankrupt the fund, as the appellant's brief 
suggests (page 7) would happen. 
In this matter, McBrides1 reasonable attorney's fees, as 
found at trial, were $5,740.00. Add to that the fees for 
collection efforts, filing the petition for recovery from the 
fund, and for this appeal, and it can be seen that if McBrides 
are limited to $10,000.00, they may not recover enough to even 
pay costs and fees. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED UCA §61-2a-5(l) TO 
ALLOW EACH INJURED PARTY TO A REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION TO 
RECOVER UP TO $10,000 AGAINST A LICENSEE, LIMITED TO A 
MAXIMUM OF $50,000 PER LICENSEE. 
Booth v. Robinson 195 Cal. Rptr. 130, 147 Cal. App. 3d 371 
(1983) was a case dealing with the Real Estate Fund under the 
California Business and Professions Code. The Superior Court 
found that Robinson, a broker, defrauded Booth in two 
transactions, and ordered recovery on both. On appeal, the Court 
set forth the standards for review of this type of case as 
follows: 
"A judgment or order of the superior court is presumed 
correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to 
support it on matters as to which the record is silent and 
error must be affirmatively shown. . . . This court must 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party giving him every reasonable inference and 
resolving conflicts in support of the judgment." 
The wording of the Utah statute consistently refers to 
individuals, starting off with "A person may bring a claim. . ." 
and continues to refer to "the person", clearly implying that 
each injured person may bring a claim. The district court's 
interpretation is therefore consistent with the plain language 
and ordinary meaning of the words used. This interpretation 
fully comports with the rule of construction set forth in UCA § 
68-3-11, which requires words and phrases to be construed 
according to the context and the approved usage of the language. 
In fact, according to Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion 
85-30, Utah State Bulletin 85-13, p. 31 (06/03/85) it is a 
cardinal rule of statutory construction that statutes must be 
given their usual, ordinary, plain, natural and common meaning, 
and UCA § 68-3-11 gives legislative sanction to this very rule. 
The interpretation the Division seeks is unreasonable. For 
example, if a developer constructed a commercial high rise office 
building, and listed it with a licensee to sell or lease the 
200-300 offices, and if that licensee obtained down payments or 
deposits from perhaps 100 prospective buyers or tenants, who do 
not even know each other, over a 2-3 year period, and converted 
the money to his personal use, then under the Division's 
interpretation of the statute, since only one parcel of real 
property is involved and since there was only one listing 
agreement, the 100 victims could only recover a total of only 
$10,000, or $100 each. Worse yet, if one of the victims was 
extra vigilant, thst victim might quickly obtain judgment and 
petition for recovery and receive the full $10,000, leaving the 
slower 99 victims, who might later obtain their judgments and 
file their petitions, to be turned down cold because the $10,000 
allowed for that "transaction", that one parcel of property and 
that one listing, had already been paid. 
The statute provides protection for the Recovery Fund in the 
case of a licensee with multiple victims by limiting the recovery 
to $50,000 against each licensee. The license of any real estate 
licensee for whom payment from the fund is made is automatically 
revoked (see UCA § 61-2a-9), so it is not likely that licensees 
could continue committing offenses obligating the Recovery Fund. 
It is more likely that there would be multiple victims of a 
licensee's fraud. For this reason the statute has the limitation 
of $50,000 per licensee. The largest amount paid out of the fund 
through April, 1986 for any one licensee was $40,000.00 paid for 
licensee Robert D. Quayle, consisting of four payments of 
$10,000.00 each, all paid on October 4, 1984 (Spring, 1985 
edition of the Utah Real Estate News). By providing a maximum of 
$50,000 per licensee and by automatically revoking licenses, the 
legislature shows that it clearly intended to allow each 
individual victim to recovery up to $10,000 until the $50,000 
limit is reached. 
The district court found that the Utah Real Estate Recovery 
Fund Act was remedial in nature and should be given a liberal 
construction to promote its purposes (R 160). The name of the 
act is the "Real Estate Recovery Fund Act" (Section 61-2a-l) and 
its first stated purpose, set forth in Section 61-2a-2(l), is to 
reimburse the public for damages caused by defaulting licensees. 
Remedial statutes are to be given a liberal construction to 
advance, rather than limit, their purposes. In Booth v. 
Robinson, supra, dealing with the California section equivalent 
to Utahfs Section 61-2a-5 of the Act, the Court stated: 
"Section 10471 is a remedial statute. It is intended to 
nml-ppf thp nnbl ic aaainst loss resultina from 
estate brokers who are unable to respond to damage awards. 
It is to be given a liberal construction. Remedial statutes 
are to be construed to promote their purposes and protect 
persons within their purview. Relief will be granted unless 
clearly forbidden by statute. The statute will be construed 
when its meaning is doubtful so as to suppress the mischief 
at which it is directed, to advance or extend the remedy 
provided, and to bring within the scope of the law every 
case which comes clearly within its spirit and policy." 
(Citations omitted). 
The plain language of the statute, logic and common sense, 
along with the rule of construction for remedial statutes, all 
support the judgment of the district court. If the Utah 
legislature had intended to limit the statute the way the 
Division contends, it could have easily done so, just as the 
California legislature did. In 1969, the California legislature 
added a limitation not found in the Utah statute. This 
limitation completely distinguishes the McBrides1 case from the 
Division's main case of Dombalian v. Fox, 152 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 
Cal. App. 3d 763 (1979) . The Division relies heavily upon 
Dombalian, citing it as a case "construing similar Real Estate 
Recovery Fund statutes" (p. 12, Appellant's Brief) to support 
thg argument that recovery is limited to 510,000 where there are 
multiple victims on one parcel of real estate. In actual fact, 
the California and Utah statutes are different, and not similar, 
in one critical respect. The Dombalian opinion distinguishes 
itself from the Utah statute by stating, on page 88, referring to 
the California legislature, that: 
"In 1969 (Stats. 1969, ch. 729, § 2, p. 1463) it [the 
legislature] amended section 10471 by adding the proviso 
that 'nothing shall be construed to obligate [the fund] for 
more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per transaction 
regardless of the number of persons aggrieved or parcels of 
real estate involved in such transaction1." (Emphasis 
Added). 
The underlined part in the above quote is not found in the 
Utah statute. Utah's statute is not written to impose a $10,000 
limit where four persons are injured, as McBrides have been, by a 
licensee on a single parcel of real estate. If Utah had the same 
limitation, the Division's argument would have some merit. If 
the Division desires the same limitation that applies in 
California, as its argument on appeal suggests, then that is a 
matter it should take up with the legislature, and not attempt to 
to have the Supreme Court twist the statute to its liking. 
The California statute has other limitations not found in 
the Utah statute. For example, Section 10471 requires that the 
licensee not only must be licensed at the time of the commission 
of the fraudulent acts giving rise to recovery, but also that the 
licensee "performed acts for which that license was required". 
Many California cases have denied recovery on the grounds that no 
license was required in the transactions under scrutiny. The 
Utah act allows recovery against a licensee for fraud or deceit 
11
 in any real estate transaction11, Section 61-2a-5(l). The Utah 
law has a much broader coverage than the California law, and 
the District Court was correct in permitting each of the McBrides 
to recover under the act. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED 
UPON FIVE TRANSACTIONS OF FRAUD IS FINAL, AND RES JUDICATA, 
AND THE DIVISION WAIVED ITS OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE TO 
CHALLENGE THOSE FINDINGS. THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT BASIS UPON 
WHICH RECOVERY OF $10,000 PER TRANSACTION SHOULD BE ALLOWED, 
LIMITED TO $50,000 PER LICENSEE AND LIMITED TO McBRIDE'S 
ACTUAL JUDGMENT. 
The Division was served with notice of the action McBrides 
were commencing against Carter (R 97, 107-110)• Section 
61-2a-5(l) of the Utah Code gives the Division the unconditional 
right to intervene in the action. By intervening in the action, 
the Division could, if appropriate, attempt to limit recovery 
from the fund by showing that the requisite fraud was lacking in 
the transaction or by limiting the number of transactions 
involved. The Division did not choose to intervene in the 
lawsuit between McBrides and Carter. 
The lawsuit proceeded to trial on January 30, 1987 and the 
trial court entered its findings and judgment April 9, 1987, 
stating in both the findings and the judgment that its judgment 
against Carter was based upon five transactions of fraud and 
misrepresentation. The findings and judgment became final and 
are res judicata as to the parties actually named and properly 
served therein, as well as to the Division, which received notice 
and elected not to exercise its right to intervene. 
However, the Division did act on the complaints McBrides 
filed with the Division against Carter, and revoked his license 
for failure to remit funds and for dishonest dealings. The 
Division's report of their disciplinary action (R 110) mentions 
three of his fraudulent transactions (1) failing to apply some of 
McBrides1 payments to the contractual obligation; (2) after being 
tully paid by McBrides but before deeding McBrides the property, 
Carter assigned the contract and pledged the property as security 
by placing a $39,733.50 Trust Deed against it; and (3) by failing 
to pay the debt represented by the Trust Deed, the property was 
sold at a foreclosure sale. 
It seems difficult to understand how the Division can 
describe Carter's conduct in three transactions in the 
disciplinary action, and still maintain that there was only one 
transaction for purposes of the Recovery Act. 
Carter failed to account for at least three of the annual 
payments made by McBrides, which is why the escrow records showed 
a balance of $10,112.67 when in truth the contract was fully 
paid. These three fraudulent acts were lumped by the trial court 
into one transaction of fraud. The Division contends that these 
acts and the other four set forth in the findings are really all 
one transaction of fraud. That doesn't make sense. If a person 
defrauds a bank by forgery three times over an eight year period 
(Carter took three payments over an eight year period without 
applying them to the obligation), is it one crime or three? The 
answer is obvious. In actual fact then, there were not five 
transactions of fraud, but seven. 
These separate and identifiable transactions of fraud 
constitute independent ground for sustaining the trial court's 
ruling. Thus, the judgment should be affirmed even if multiple 
claimants are required to aggregate their claims. 
The Division contends that if there is only one parcel of 
property involved, no matter how many fraudulent acts a licensee 
might perpetrate regarding it, there is only one "transaction" as 
far as the Recovery Act is concerned. The California case of 
Booth v. Robinson, supra, illustrates the Division's erroneous 
thinking. In this case, the Court found two separate 
transactions of fraud without any parcel of real property being 
involved. In Booth, the licensee, Robinson, obtained $15,000 
from Booth upon promises to invest the money in real estate that 
would produce an income of $150.00 a month. A few months later, 
Robinson obtained another $3,500.00 from Booth on promises that 
with the money Robinson could take over a house and double 
Booth's money when the house was sold. Robinson disappeared with 
the money and never did invest either the $15,000 or the $3,500 
in any real estate. The trial court held that there were two 
transactions and granted Booth's application, awarding $10,000.00 
as to the first transaction (the limit of recovery for one 
transaction) and $3,500 plus interest as to the second 
transaction, and their costs. In doing so, the Court stated: 
"That Robinson never in fact made the investments for the 
Booths does not preclude recovery for she had assumed to do 
so." 
The Division cannot attack that judgment more than a year 
after it became final. The finding of five fraudulent 
transactions, whether right or wrong, is now res judicata. 
Doctrines of waiver, estoppel and laches bar the Division's late 
attack on those findings. Since there were five transactions of 
fraud, McBrides are entitled to recover up to $10,000.00 for each 
one, limited to the $50,000.00 cap per licensee. The $23,000.00 
ordered by the trial court is well within that overall 
limitation. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE STATUTE IN EFFECT 
AT THE TIME McBRIDEfS CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE AND NOTICE WAS 
GIVEN TO THE DIVISION, APPLYING THE CORRECT STATUTE ALLOWS 
McBRIDES TO RECOVER THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCLUDED 
IN THEIR JUDGMENT AGAINST CARTER. 
The McBride's cause of action against Carter arose upon 
their discovery of the Trust Deed he caused to be recorded 
against the property they had purchased from him. This discovery 
was made shortly before the foreclosure sale held on January 16, 
1986. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that he had 
received at least three annual payments without applying them to 
the contractual obligation. McBrides were forced to purchase 
their property again at the foreclosure sale. They filed their 
complaint commencing this action on February 7, 1986. It is 
clear that their cause of action arose in January, 1986. 
Section 61-2a-5 (1) of the Utah Code was amended between 
January, 1986, when McBrides cause of action arose, and the date 
of May 16, 1988 when McBrides filed their verified petition 
seeking recovery from the Recovery Fund. J. Philip 
Eves, the District Court Judge, made the following conclusion of 
law (R 160): 
"1. That the law in effect at the time the petition for 
recovery was filed in May, 1988 is the applicable law 
governing this case." 
The Distirct Court erred in making this conclusion of law. 
The applicable law is the law in effect at the time the cause of 
action against Carter arose. Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial 
Commission, 725 ,P. 2d 1335 (Utah, 1986) states the rule as 
follows: 
"The general rule is that the law establishing substantive 
rights and liabilities when a cause of action arises, and 
not a subsequently enacted statute, governs the resolution 
of the dispute. (Citations omitted.) See also § 68-3-3, 
which states: 'No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared.1" 
The material change in the statute, insofar as this case is 
concerned, was the addition of the following sentence to Section 
61-2a-5(1): 
"Recovery from the fund may not include punitive damages, 
attorneyfs fees, interest or court costs." 
Because of the addition of this sentence, Judge Eves refused 
to order the Division to pay the $5,740.00 attorney's fees and 
the $286.31 costs that were included in the April 9, 1987 
judgment against Carter and were part of the $29,026.31 being 
sought in the verified petition (R 96-110). 
Since notice to the Division must be given concurrently with 
the filing of a lawsuit against a licensee as a prerequisite for 
a later petition for recovery, the law at the time of the notice 
should logically apply. Otherwise, it is conceivable that the 
Division could receive notice of a batch of claims against 
licensees, and have the statute amended to exclude such claims 
from recovery in the year or more it may take to prosecute the 
claims to judgment, and then when the petitions are later filed, 
deny recovery. 
The next question is whether or not the $5,740.00 in fees 
and the $286.31 in costs should be ordered paid from the Recovery 
Fund even if the correct law is applied. The Division will be 
quick to argue that even the old statute does not allow 
attorney's fees and costs because it provides as follows: 
"Recovery from the fund shall be for the actual damages 
included in the judgment and unpaid, but not more than 
$10,000 for a single transaction and no more than $50,000 
for any one licensee." 
McBrides respond that their fees and costs are an element of 
their actual damages just as surely as the $23,000.00 they 
incurred to obtain their property through foreclosure. Allowance 
of attorney's tees as damages in quiet title actions has been 
approved, see South Sanpitch Company v> Pack 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 2 
(Filed December 13, 1988). McBrides were forced to quiet their 
title by purchasing their property a second time at the 
foreclosure sale. Allowance of attorney's fees as damages has 
also been recognized in several other situations, such as damages 
for breach of contract Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford 
Accident & Ind. Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d 906 (1958); and even 
in instances of negligence, commonly referred to as the 
third-party tort rule (South Sanpitch, supra). Carter certainly 
breached the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit P-2) and the 
findings of fraud and misrepresentation establish a tort basis 
for the fees as damages. 
It should be emphasized that McBrides are not seeking 
attorney's fees and costs in connection with their petition for 
recovery from the Recovery Fund or for their fees on this appeal 
(although perhaps they should), but only for their attorney's 
fees incurred in obtaining judgment against Carter. 
Rules of statutory construction support McBrides1 position 
that they should have recovered their fees and costs under the 
former statute, even though its language is "actual damages". 
This is so because the amendment of a statute is presumed to 
effect a change in the original act by either creating new rights 
or taking away existing ones. This rule of statutory 
construction is stated in Volume 1A, Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction (4th ed. 1973) §22.30, p. 178 as follows: 
"The mere fact that the legislature enacts an amendment 
indicates that it thereby intended to change the original 
act by creating a new right or withdrawing an existing one. 
Therefore, any material change in the language of the 
original act is presumed to indicate a change in legal 
rights." 
Therefore, it must be presumed that prior to the amendment, 
recovery of attorney's fees, interest and costs was available, 
and now, by force of the amendment, those items can no longer be 
recovered. 
Of course, McBrides acknowledge that the term "actual 
damages" in the applicable statute does not include punitive 
damages, and therefore McBrides did not request recovery of the 
$5,000.00 awarded as punitive damages when they filed their 
petition. They seek only the inclusion of their fees and costs 
as damages in the payment from the Recovery Fund. 
California cases have allowed costs and interest under their 
statute which has, since 1968, limited recovery to "actual and 
direct loss to the claimant in the transaction" (Section 10471 of 
the Business and Professions Code). In Dierenfield v. Stabile 
243 Cal. Rptr. 598, (Cal. App. 1988) the court held that "actual 
and direct loss" did not allow the victims to recover the benefit 
of the bargain, but that it did authorize recovery of amounts 
necessary to restore them to their former situation, saying: 
"Viewed as a whole we find that the statutory scheme is not 
intended to ensure that applicants recover profits, rather 
the intent is to prevent applicants from suffering losses on 
money actually paid. Therefore we hold that the applicant 
should be placed in the same position in which he or she 
would have been if the transaction had never occurred. 
• • . 
Under this rule the applicant's recovery from the fund is 
limited to the amount of the principal actually paid out 
plus interest at the statutory rate from the date the 
principal is paid out until the date it is returned." 
McBrides, of course, would not have incurred any attorney's 
fees or Court costs if Carter had not defrauded them. Therefore, 
in order to place McBrides in the same position they would have 
been in if the transaction had never occurred, they must recover 
their attorney's fees and costs. 
In Nordahl v. Franzalia 121 Cal. Rptr. 794, 47 Cal. App. 3d 
592 (1975) the evolution of the California statute was discussed. 
In 1968 an amendment substituted "actual and direct loss" for 
"actual damages". Regarding the original language of "actual 
damages" the court said: 
"This language was ambiguous since the words "actual 
damages" could have referred as well to the amount actually 
awarded in the judgment as to the amount of damage actually 
suffered." 
The language in Utah's statute is still "actual damages", and is 
similarly ambiguous. When a remedial statute is ambiguous, it 
should be given a liberal construction. Doing so in this case 
compels the conclusion that McBrides should be entitled to 
recover all the damages awarded in the judgment against Carter 
except for the punitive damages, amounting to $29,026.31. 
The following statements from the Nordahl opinion are 
equally applicable to justify the inclusion of attorney's fees, 
interest and costs in McBridefs situation: 
"Though the recovery thereby permitted is intended to be 
limited in nature (a limit of 510,000 per transaction is 
imposed), there can be no question but that the purpose of 
section 10471 of the Business and Professions Code is 
remedial. . . . Within the limitation stated it must, 
therefore, be given a liberal construction. . . . 
Liberally construed, the language of section 10471 
authorizes the inclusion of both the interest and the costs 
under the circumstances of this case. . . . "When, by 
virtue of the fraud or breach of fiduciary duty of the 
defendant, a plaintiff has been deprived of the use of his 
money or property and is obliged to resort to litigation to 
recover it, the inclusion of interest in the award is 
necessary in order to make the plaintiff whole." 
Not only should the Supreme Court add the fees of $5,740.00 
and costs of $286.31 to McBrides1 recovery of $23,000, but 
interest on the $23,000 from the April 9, 1987 judgment date to 
date of payment should be included. McBride's are still not 
whole, having been required to bear the costs and attorney's fees 
cf petitioning the Recovery Fund and for zhe costs and attorney's 
fees on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly allowed each person to maintain 
a claim for damages against the Recovery Fund, giving a liberal 
construction to the remedial statute. The decision cf the 
District Ccurt is also proper on a transactional basis, as there 
were at least five transactions of fraud, each with a $10,000 
limit against licensee Carter, more than sufficient to cover 
uhe damages tc FcBrides. 
The District Ccurt should have aoclied the statute in effect 
when the cause of action arose. Applying the proper statute 
permits McBrides1 attorney's fees and costs that were included 
in the judgment against Carter to be recovered as damages, 
together with interest thereon. 
THEREFORE, the McBrides request the Court to affirm the 
District Court's decision as far as it went, but to also include 
fees, costs and interest in the allowable recovery-
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